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This article was first published in the Winter 1992-93 issue of Parameters.
The letter that follows takes us on a darkly imagined excursion into 
the future. A military coup has taken place in the United States—the year is 
2012—and General Thomas E. T. Brutus, Commander-in-Chief of the Unified 
Armed Forces of the United States, now occupies the White House as permanent 
Military Plenipotentiary. His position has been ratified by a national referen-
dum, though scattered disorders still prevail and arrests for acts of sedition are 
underway. A senior retired officer of the Unified Armed Forces, known here 
simply as Prisoner 222305759, is one of those arrested, having been convicted 
by court-martial for opposing the coup. Prior to his execution, he is able to 
smuggle out of prison a letter to an old War College classmate discussing the 
“Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012.” In it, he argues that the coup 
was the outgrowth of trends visible as far back as 1992. These trends were the 
massive diversion of military forces to civilian uses, the monolithic unification 
of the armed forces, and the insularity of the military community. His letter 
survives and is here presented verbatim. 
It goes without saying (I hope) that the coup scenario above is 
purely a literary device intended to dramatize my concern over certain 
contemporary developments affecting the armed forces, and is emphatically not 
a prediction.
—The Author
Dear Old Friend, 
It’s hard to believe that 20 years have passed since we graduated from the 
War College! Remember the great discussions, the trips, the parties, the people? 
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Those were the days!!! I’m not having quite as much fun anymore. You’ve 
heard about the Sedition Trials? Yeah, I was one of those arrested—convicted 
of “disloyal statements,” and “using contemptuous language towards officials.” 
Disloyal? No. Contemptuous? You bet! With General Brutus in charge it’s not 
hard to be contemptuous. 
I’ve got to hand it to Brutus, he’s ingenious. After the President died he 
somehow “persuaded” the Vice President not to take the oath of office. Did we 
then have a President or not? A real “Constitutional Conundrum” the papers 
called it.1 Brutus created just enough ambiguity to convince everyone that as the 
senior military officer, he could—and should— declare himself Commander-
in-Chief of the Unified Armed Forces. Remember what he said? “Had to fill 
the power vacuum.” And Brutus showed he really knew how to use power: 
he declared martial law, “postponed” the elections, got the Vice President to 
“retire,” and even moved into the White House! “More efficient to work from 
there,” he said. Remember that?
When Congress convened that last time and managed to pass the 
Referendum Act, I really got my hopes up. But when the Referendum approved 
Brutus’s takeover, I knew we were in serious trouble. I caused a ruckus, you 
know, trying to organize a protest. Then the Security Forces picked me up. My 
quickie “trial” was a joke. The sentence? Well, let’s just say you won’t have to 
save any beer for me at next year’s reunion. Since it doesn’t look like I’ll be 
seeing you again, I thought I’d write everything down and try to get it to you. 
I am calling my paper the “Origins of the American Military Coup of 
2012.” I think it’s important to get the truth recorded before they rewrite history. 
If we’re ever going to get our freedom back, we’ve got to understand how we got 
into this mess. People need to understand that armed forces exist to support and 
defend government, not to be the government. Faced with intractable national 
problems on one hand, and an energetic and capable military on the other, it can 
be all too seductive to start viewing the military as a cost-effective solution. We 
made a terrible mistake when we allowed the armed forces to be diverted from 
their original purpose. 
I found a box of my notes and clippings from our War College days—
told my keepers I needed them to write the confession they want. It’s amazing; 
looking through these old papers makes me realize that even back in 1992 we 
should have seen this coming. The seeds of this outrage were all there; we just 
didn’t realize how they would grow. But isn’t that always the way with things 
like this? Somebody once said that “the true watersheds in human affairs are 
seldom spotted amid the tumult of headlines broadcast on the hour.”2 And we 
had a lot of headlines back in the ‘90s to distract us: The economy was in the 
dumps, crime was rising, schools were deteriorating, drug use was rampant, the 
environment was in trouble, and political scandals were occurring almost daily. 
Still, there was some good news: the end of the Cold War as well as America’s 
recent victory over Iraq. 
All of this and more contributed to the situation in which we find 
ourselves today: a military that controls government and one that, ironically, 
can’t fight. It wasn’t any single cause that led us to this point. Instead, it was a 
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combination of several different developments, the beginnings of which were 
evident in 1992. Here’s what I think happened: 
Americans became exasperated with democracy. We were disillusioned 
with the apparent inability of elected government to solve the nation’s dilem-
mas. We were looking for someone or something that could produce workable 
answers. The one institution of government in which the people retained faith 
was the military. Buoyed by the military’s obvious competence in the First Gulf 
War, the public increasingly turned to it for solutions to the country’s problems. 
Americans called for an acceleration of trends begun in the 1980s: tasking the 
military with a variety of new, non-traditional missions, and vastly escalating 
its commitment to formerly ancillary duties. 
Though not obvious at the time, the cumulative effect of these new 
responsibilities was to incorporate the military into the political process to an 
unprecedented degree. These additional assignments also had the perverse 
effect of diverting focus and resources from the military’s central mission of 
combat training and warfighting. Finally, organizational, political, and societal 
changes served to alter the American military’s culture. Today’s military is not 
the one we knew when we graduated from the War College. 
Let me explain how I came to these conclusions. In 1992 not very many 
people would’ve thought a military coup d’état could ever happen here. Sure, 
there were eccentric conspiracy theorists who saw the Pentagon’s hand in the 
assassination of President Kennedy,3 President Nixon’s downfall,4 and similar 
events. But even the most avid believers had to admit that no outright military 
takeover had ever occurred before now. Heeding Washington’s admonitions in 
his farewell address about the dangers of overgrown military establishments,5 
Americans generally viewed their armed forces with a judicious mixture of 
respect and wariness.6 For over two centuries that vigilance was rewarded, and 
most Americans came to consider the very notion of a military coup preposter-
ous. Historian Andrew Janos captured the conventional view of the latter half 
of the 20th century in this clipping I saved: 
A coup d’état in the United States would be too fantastic to contem-
plate, not only because few would actually entertain the idea, but also 
because the bulk of the people are strongly attached to the prevail-
ing political system and would rise in defense of a political leader 
even though they might not like him. The environment most hospi-
table to coups d’état is one in which political apathy prevails as the  
dominant style.7
However, when Janos wrote that back in 1964, 61.9 percent of the elec-
torate voted. Since then voter participation has steadily declined. By 1988 only 
50.1 percent of the eligible voters cast a ballot.8 Simple extrapolation of those 
numbers to last spring’s Referendum would have predicted almost exactly the 
turnout. It was precisely reversed from that of 1964: 61.9 percent of the elector-
ate did not vote. 
America’s societal malaise was readily apparent in 1992. Seventy-eight 
percent of Americans believed the country was on the “wrong track.” One 
researcher declared that social indicators were at their lowest level in 20 years 
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and insisted “something [was] coming loose in the social infrastructure.” The 
nation was frustrated and angry about its problems.9
America wanted solutions and democratically elected government 
wasn’t providing them.10 The country suffered from a “deep pessimism about 
politicians and government after years of broken promises.”11 David Finkle 
observed in the Washington Post Magazine that for most Americans “the 
perception of government is that it has evolved from something that provides 
democracy’s framework into something that provides obstacles, from some-
thing to celebrate into something to ignore.” Likewise, politicians and their 
proposals seemed stale and repetitive. Millions of voters gave up hope of finding 
answers.12 The “environment of apathy” Janos characterized as a precursor to 
a coup had arrived. 
Unlike the rest of government the military enjoyed a remarkably steady 
climb in popularity throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.13 And indeed it had 
earned the admiration of the public. Debilitated by the Vietnam War, the US 
military set about reinventing itself. As early as 1988 U.S. News & World 
Report heralded the result: “In contrast to the dispirited, drug-ravaged, do-
your-own-thing armed services of the ‘70s and early ‘80s the US military has 
been transformed into a fighting force of gung-ho attitude, spit-shined disci-
pline, and ten-hut morale.”14 After the US military dealt Iraq a crushing defeat 
in the First Gulf War, the ignominy of Vietnam evaporated.
When we graduated from the War College in 1992, the armed forces 
were the smartest, best educated, and best disciplined force in history.15 While 
polls showed that the public invariably gave Congress low marks, a February 
1991 survey disclosed that “public confidence in the military soar[ed] to 85 
percent, far surpassing every other institution in our society.” The armed forces 
had become America’s most—and perhaps only— trusted arm of government.16
Assumptions about the role of the military in society also began to 
change. Twenty years before we graduated, the Supreme Court confidently 
declared in Laird v. Tatum that Americans had a “traditional and strong resis-
tance to any military intrusion into civilian affairs.”17 But Americans were now 
rethinking the desirability and necessity of that resistance. They compared the 
military’s principled competence with the chicanery and ineptitude of many 
elected officials, and found the latter wanting.18
Commentator James Fallows expressed the new thinking in an August 
1991 article in Atlantic magazine. Musing on the contributions of the military 
to American society, Fallows wrote: I am beginning to think that the only way 
the national government can do anything worthwhile is to invent a security 
threat and turn the job over to the military.” He elaborated on his reasoning: 
According to our economic and political theories, most agencies of 
the government have no special standing to speak about the general 
national welfare. Each represents a certain constituency; the interest 
groups fight it out. The military, strangely, is the one government 
institution that has been assigned legitimacy to act on its notion of 
the collective good. “National defense” can make us do things—train 
engineers, build highways—that long-term good of the nation or 
common sense cannot.19
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About a decade before Fallows’ article appeared, Congress initiated 
the use of “national defense” as a rationale to boost military participation in an 
activity historically the exclusive domain of civilian government: law enforce-
ment. Congress concluded that the “rising tide of drugs being smuggled into 
the United States . . . present[ed] a grave threat to all Americans.” Finding the 
performance of civilian law enforcement agencies in counteracting that threat 
unsatisfactory, Congress passed the Military Cooperation with Civilian Law 
Enforcement Agencies Act of 1981.20 In doing so Congress specifically intended 
to force reluctant military commanders to actively collaborate in police work.21
This was a historic change of policy. Since the passage of the Posse 
Comitatus Act in 1878, the military had distanced itself from law enforcement 
activities.22 While the 1987 law did retain certain limits on the legal authority of 
military personnel, its net effect was to dramatically expand military participa-
tion in anti-drug efforts.23 By 1991 the Department of Defense was spending 
$1.2 billion on counternarcotics crusades. Air Force surveillance aircraft were 
sent to track airborne smugglers; Navy ships patrolled the Caribbean looking 
for drug-laden vessels; and National Guardsmen were searching for marijuana 
caches near the borders.24 By 1992 “combatting” drug trafficking was formally 
declared a “high national security mission.”25
It wasn’t too long before 21st-century legislators were calling for more 
military involvement in police work.26 Crime seemed out of control. Most dis-
turbing, the incidence of violent crime continued to climb.27 Americans were 
horrified and desperate: a third even believed vigilantism could be justified.28 
Rising lawlessness was seen as but another example of the civilian political 
leadership’s inability to fulfill government’s most basic duty to ensure public 
safety.29 People once again wanted the military to help.
Hints of an expanded police function were starting to surface while 
we were still at the War College. For example, District of Columbia National 
Guardsmen established a regular military presence in high-crime areas.30 
Eventually, people became acclimated to seeing uniformed military person-
nel patrolling their neighborhood.31 Now troops are an adjunct to almost all 
police forces in the country. In many of the areas where much of our bur-
geoning population of elderly Americans live—Brutus calls them “National 
Security Zones”— the military is often the only law enforcement agency. 
Consequently, the military was ideally positioned in thousands of communi-
ties to support the coup.
Concern about crime was a major reason why General Brutus’s actions 
were approved in the Referendum. Although voter participation by the general 
public was low, older Americans voted at a much higher rate.32 Furthermore, 
with the aging of the baby boom generation, the block of American voters over 
45 grew to almost 53 percent of the voters by 2010.33 This wealthy,34 older elec-
torate welcomed an organization which could ensure their physical security.35 
When it counted, they backed Brutus in the Referendum—probably the last 
votes they’ll ever cast.
The military’s constituency was larger than just the aged. Poor 
Americans of all ages became dependent upon the military not only for 
protection against crime, but also for medical care. Again we saw the roots 
Charles J. Dunlap Jr. 
112 Parameters
of this back in 1992. First it was the barely defeated proposal to use veter-
ans’ hospitals to provide care for the non-veteran poor.36 Next were calls to 
deploy military medical assets to relieve hard-pressed urban hospitals.37 As 
the number of uninsured and underinsured grew, the pressure to provide care 
became inexorable. Now military hospitals serve millions of new, non-military 
patients. Similarly, a proposal to use so-called “underutilized” military bases 
as drug rehabilitation centers was implemented on a massive scale.38
Even the youngest citizens were co-opted. During the 1990s the public 
became aware that military officers had the math and science backgrounds 
desperately needed to revitalize US education.39 In fact, programs involving 
military personnel were already underway while we were at the War College.40 
We now have an entire generation of young people who have grown up com-
fortable with the sight of military personnel patrolling their streets and teaching 
in their classrooms.
As you know, it wasn’t just crises in public safety, medical care, and 
education that the military was tasked to mend. The military was also called 
upon to manage the cleanup of the nation’s environmental hazards. By 1992 
the armed services were deeply involved in this arena, and that involvement 
mushroomed. Once the military demonstrated its expertise, it wasn’t long 
before environmental problems were declared “national security threats” and 
full responsibility devolved to the armed forces.41
Other problems were transformed into “national security” issues. As 
more commercial airlines went bankrupt and unprofitable air routes dropped, 
the military was called upon to provide “essential” air transport to the affected 
regions. In the name of national defense, the military next found itself in the 
sealift business. Ships purchased by the military for contingencies were leased, 
complete with military crews, at low rates to US exporters to help solve the 
trade deficit.42 The nation’s crumbling infrastructure was also declared a 
“national security threat.” As was proposed back in 1991, troops rehabilitated 
public housing, rebuilt bridges and roads, and constructed new government 
buildings. By late 1992, voices in both Congress and the military had reached 
a crescendo calling for military involvement across a broad spectrum of here-
tofore purely civilian activities.43 Soon, it became common in practically every 
community to see crews of soldiers working on local projects.44 Military attire 
drew no stares. 
The revised charter for the armed forces was not confined to domestic 
enterprises. Overseas humanitarian and nation-building assignments prolifer-
ated.45 Though these projects have always been performed by the military on 
an ad hoc basis, in 1986 Congress formalized that process. It declared overseas 
humanitarian and civic assistance activities to be “valid military missions” and 
specifically authorized them by law.46 Fueled by favorable press for operations 
in Iraq, Bangladesh, and the Philippines during the early 1990s, humanitarian 
missions were touted as the military’s “model for the future.”47 That prediction 
came true. When several African governments collapsed under AIDS epidemics 
and famines around the turn of the century, US troops—first introduced to the 
continent in the 1990s—were called upon to restore basic services. They never 
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left.48 Now the US military constitutes the de facto government in many of those 
areas. Once again, the first whisperings of such duties could be heard in 1992.49
By the year 2000 the armed forces had penetrated many vital aspects of 
American society. More and more military officers sought the kind of autonomy 
in these civilian affairs that they would expect from their military superiors 
in the execution of traditional combat operations. Thus began the inevitable 
politicization of the military. With so much responsibility for virtually every-
thing government was expected to do, the military increasingly demanded a 
larger role in policymaking. but in a democracy policymaking is a task best left 
to those accountable to the electorate. Nonetheless, well-intentioned military 
officers, accustomed to the ordered, hierarchial structure of military society, 
became impatient with the delays and inefficiencies inherent in the democratic 
process. Consequently, they increasingly sought to avoid it. They convinced 
themselves that they could more productively serve the nation in carrying 
out their new assignments if they accrued to themselves unfettered power to 
implement their programs. They forgot Lord Acton’s warning that “all power 
corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”50
Congress became their unwitting ally. Because of the popularity of the 
new military programs—and the growing dependence upon them—Congress 
passed the Military Plenipotentiary Act of 2005. This legislation was the legacy 
of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Among many 
revisions, Goldwater-Nchols strengthened the office of the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff and mandated numerous changes intended to increase 
“jointness” in the armed services.51 Supporters of the Military Plenipotentiary 
Act argued that unity of command was critical to the successful management 
of the numerous activities now considered “military” operations. Moreover, 
many Congressmen mistakenly believed that Goldwater-Nichols was one 
of the main reasons for the military’s success in the First Gulf War.52 They 
viewed the Military Plenipotentiary Act as an enhancement of the strengths of 
Goldwater-Nichols.
In passing this legislation Congress added greater authority to the mili-
tary’s top leadership position. Lulled by favorable experiences with Chairmen 
like General Colin Powell,53 Congress saw little danger in converting the office 
of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff into the even more powerful Military 
Plenipotentiary. No longer merely an advisor, the Military Plenipotentiary 
became a true commander of all US services, purportedly because that status 
could better ameliorate the effects of perceived interservice squabbling. Despite 
warnings found in the legislative history of Goldwater-Nichols and elsewhere, 
enormous power was concentrated in the hands of a single, unelected official.54 
Unfortunately, Congress presumed that principled people would always occupy 
the office.55 No one expected a General Brutus would arise. 
The Military Plenipotentiary was not Congress’s only structural change 
in military governance. By 2007 the services were combined to form the 
Unified Armed Forces. Recall that when we graduated from the War College 
greater unification was being seriously suggested as an economy measure.56 
Eventually that consideration, and the conviction that “jointness” was an 
unqualified military virtue,57 led to unification. But unification ended the 
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creative tension between the services.58 Besides rejecting the operational logic 
of separate services,59 no one seemed to recognize the checks-and-balances 
function that service separatism provided a democracy obliged to maintain 
a large, professional military establishment. The Founding Fathers knew the 
importance of checks and balances in controlling the agencies of government: 
“Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. . . . Experience has taught 
mankind the necessity of auxiliary controls . . .[including] supplying opposite 
and rival interests.”60
Ambition is a natural trait of military organizations and their leaders.61 
Whatever might have been the inefficiencies of separate military services, their 
very existence served to counteract the untoward desires of any single service. 
The roles and missions debates and other arguments, once seen as petty mili-
tary infighting, also provided an invaluable forum for competitive analysis 
of military doctrine. Additionally, they served to ensure that unscrupulous 
designs by a segment of the military establishment were ruthlessly exposed. 
Once the services were unified, the impetus to do so vanished, and the author-
ity of the military in relation to the other institutions of government rose.62 
Distended by its pervasive new duties, monolithic militarism came to dominate 
the Darwinian political environment of 21st-century America.
Why did the uniformed leadership of our day acquiesce to this trans-
formation of the military? Much of the answer can be traced to the budget 
showdowns of the early 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet Union left the US 
military without an easily articulated rationale for large defense budgets. 
Billions in cuts were sought. Journalist Bruce Auster put it bluntly: “Winning 
a share of the budget wars . . . require[s] that the military find new missions for 
a post-Cold War world that is devoid of clear military threats.”63 Capitulating, 
military leaders embraced formerly disdained assignments. As one commen-
tator cynically observed, “the services are eager to talk up nontraditional, 
budget-justifying roles.”64 The Vietnam-era aphorism, “It’s a lousy war, but it’s 
the only one we’ve got,” was resuscitated. 
Still, that doesn’t completely explain why in 2012 the military leadership 
would succumb to a coup. To answer that question fully requires examination 
of what was happening to the officer corps as the military drew down in the 
1980s and 1990s. Ever since large peacetime military establishments became 
permanent features after World War II, the great leveler of the officer corps 
was the constant influx of officers from the Reserve Officers Training Corps 
program. The product of diverse colleges and universities throughout the United 
States, these officers were a vital source of liberalism in the military services.65
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, that was changing. Force 
reductions decreased the number of ROTC graduates the services accepted.66 
Although General Powell called ROTC “vital to democracy,” 62 ROTC pro-
grams were closed in 1991 and another 350 were considered for closure.67 
The numbers of officers produced by the service academies also fell, but at a 
significantly slower pace. Consequently, the proportion of academy graduates 
in the officer corps climbed.68 Academy graduates, along with graduates of 
such military schools as the Citadel, Virginia Military Institute, and Norwich 
University, tended to feel a greater homogeneity of outlook than, say, the pool 
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of ROTC graduates at large, with the result that as the proportion of such gradu-
ates grew, diversity of outlook overall diminished to some degree. 
Moreover, the ROTC officers that did remain increasingly came from a 
narrower range of schools. Focusing on the military’s policy to exclude homo-
sexuals from service, advocates of “political correctness” succeeded in driving 
ROTC from the campuses of some of our best universities.69 In many instances 
they also prevailed in barring military recruiters from campus.70 Little thought 
was given the long-term consequences of limiting the pool from which our 
military leadership was drawn. The result was a much more uniformly ori-
ented military elite whose outlook was progressively conservative. 
Furthermore, well-meaning attempts at improving service life led to 
the unintended insularity of military society, representing a return to the clois-
tered life of the pre-World War II armed forces. Military bases, complete with 
schools, churches, stores, child care centers, and recreational areas, became 
never-to-be-left islands of tranquility removed from the chaotic, crime-ridden 
environment outside the gates.71 As one reporter put it in 1991: “Increasingly 
isolated from mainstream America, today’s troops tend to view the civilian 
world with suspicion and sometimes hostility.”72 Thus, a physically isolated 
and intellectually alienated officer corps was paired with an enlisted force like-
wise distanced from the society it was supposed to serve. In short, the military 
evolved into a force susceptible to manipulation by an authoritarian leader from 
its own select ranks.
What made this all the more disheartening was the wretched perfor-
mance of our forces in the Second Gulf War.73 Consumed with ancillary and 
nontraditional missions, the military neglected its fundamental raison d’être. As 
the Supreme Court succinctly put it more than a half century ago, the “primary 
business of armies and navies [is] to fight or be ready to fight wars should the 
occasion arise.”74 When Iranian armies started pouring into the lower Gulf 
states in 2010, the US armed forces were ready to do anything but fight. 
Preoccupation with humanitarian duties, narcotics interdiction, and all 
the rest of the peripheral missions left the military unfit to engage an authentic 
military opponent. Performing the new missions sapped resources from what 
most experts agree was one of the vital ingredients to victory in the First Gulf 
War: training. Training is, quite literally, a zero-sum game. Each moment spent 
performing a nontraditional mission is one unavailable for orthodox military 
exercises. We should have recognized the grave risk. In 1991 the Washington 
Post reported that in “interview after interview across the services, senior 
leaders and noncommissioned officers stressed that they cannot be ready to 
fight without frequent rehearsals of perishable skills.”75
The military’s anti-drug activities were a big part of the problem. Oh 
sure, I remember the facile claims of exponents of the military’s counternar-
cotics involvement as to what “valuable” training it provided.76 Did anyone 
really think that crew members of an AWACS—an aircraft designed to track 
high-performance military aircraft in combat—significantly improved their 
skills by hours of tracking slow-moving light planes? Did they seriously 
imagine that troops enhanced combat skills by looking for marijuana under 
car seats? Did they truly believe that crews of the Navy’s sophisticated antiair 
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and anti-submarine ships received meaningful training by following lumbering 
trawlers around the Caribbean?77 Tragically, they did. 
The problem was exacerbated when political pressures exempted the 
Guard and the Reserves from the harshest effects of the budgetary cutbacks 
of the early 1990s.78 The First Gulf War demonstrated that modern weapons 
and tactics were simply too complex for part-time soldiers to master during 
their allotted drill periods, however well motivated.79 Still, creative Guard 
and Reserve defenders contrived numerous civic-action and humanitarian 
assignments and sold them as “training.” Left unexplained was how such 
training was supposed to fit with the military strategies that contemplated 
short, violent, come-as-you-are expeditionary wars.80 Nice-to-have Guard and 
Reserve support-oriented programs prevailed at the expense of critical active-
duty combat capabilities.81
Perhaps even more damaging than the diversion of resources was the 
assault on the very ethos of military service. Rather than bearing in mind the 
Supreme Court’s admonition to focus on warfighting, the military was told to 
alter its purpose. Former Secretary of State James Baker typified the trendy 
new tone in remarks about the military’s airlift of food and medicine to the 
former Soviet republics in early 1992. He said the airlift would “vividly show 
the peoples of the former Soviet Union that those that once prepared for war 
with them now have the courage and the conviction to use their militaries to 
say, ‘We will wage a new peace.’”82
In truth militaries ought to “prepare for war” and leave the “peace 
waging” to those agencies of government whose mission is just that. Nevertheless, 
such pronouncements—seconded by military leaders83—became the fashionable 
philosophy. The result? People in the military no longer considered themselves 
warriors. Instead, they perceived themselves as policemen, relief workers, 
educators, builders, health care providers, politicians—everything but warf-
ighters. When these philanthropists met the Iranian 10th Armored Corps near 
Daharan during the Second Gulf War, they were brutally slaughtered by a 
military which had not forgotten what militaries were supposed to do or what 
war is really all about. 
The devastation of the military’s martial spirit was exemplified by 
its involvement in police activities. Inexplicably, we ignored the deleterious 
effect on combat motivation suffered by the Israeli Defense Forces as a result 
of their efforts to police the West Bank and Gaza.84 Few seemed to appreciate 
the fundamental difference between the police profession and the profession 
of arms. As Richard J. Barnet observed in the New Yorker, “The line between 
police action and the military operation is real. Police derive their power from 
their acceptance as ‘officers of the law’; legitimate authority, not firepower, is 
the essential element.”85
Police organizations are understandably oriented toward the studied 
restraint necessary for the end sought: a judicial conviction. As one Drug 
Enforcement Administration agent noted: “The military can kill people better 
than we can [but] when we go to a jungle lab, we’re not there to move onto the 
target by fire and maneuver to destroy the enemy. We’re there to arrest suspects 
and seize evidence.”86 If military forces are inculcated with the same spirit 
The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012 
Winter 2010-11     117
of restraint, combat performance is threatened.87 Moreover, law enforcement 
is also not just a form of low-intensity conflict. In low-intensity conflict, the 
military aim is to win the will of the people, a virtually impossible task with 
criminals “motivated by money, not ideology.”88
Humanitarian missions likewise undermined the military’s sense of 
itself. As one Navy officer gushed during the 1991 Bangladesh relief operation, 
“It’s great to be here doing the opposite of a soldier.”89 While no true soldier 
relishes war, the fact remains that the essence of the military is warfighting 
and preparation for the same. What journalist Barton Gellman has said of the 
Army can be extrapolated to the military as a whole: it is an “organization 
whose fighting spirit depends . . . heavily on tradition.”90 If that tradition 
becomes imbued with a preference for “doing the opposite of a soldier,” fight-
ing spirit is bound to suffer. When we first heard editorial calls to “pacify the 
military” by involving it in civic projects,91 we should have given them the 
forceful rebuke they deserved.
Military analyst Harry Summers warned back in ‘91 that when militar-
ies lose sight of their purpose, catastrophe results. Citing a study of pre-World 
War II Canadian military policy as it related to the subsequent battlefield disas-
ters, he observed that:
instead of using the peacetime interregnum to hone their military 
skills, senior Canadian military officers sought out civilian mis-
sions to justify their existence. When war came they were woefully 
unprepared. Instead of protecting their soldiers’ lives they led them 
to their deaths. In today’s post-Cold War peacetime environment, 
this trap again looms large. . . . Some today within the US military 
are also searching for relevance, with draft doctrinal manuals giving 
touchy-freely prewar and postwar civil operations equal weight with 
warfighting. This is an insidious mistake.92
We must remember that America’s position at the end of the Cold War 
had no historical precedent. For the first time the nation—in peacetime—found 
itself with a still-sizable, professional military establishment that was not 
preoccupied with an overarching external threat.93 Yet the uncertainties in the 
aftermath of the Cold War limited the extent to which those forces could be 
safely downsized. When the military was then obliged to engage in a bewil-
dering array of nontraditional duties to further justify its existence, it is little 
wonder that its traditional apolitical professionalism eventually eroded. 
Clearly, the curious tapestry of military authoritarianism and combat 
ineffectiveness that we see today was not yet woven in 1992. But the threads 
were there. Knowing what I know now, here’s the advice I would have given the 
War College Class of 1992 had I been their graduation speaker:
 • Demand that the armed forces focus exclusively on indisputably mili-
tary duties. We must not diffuse our energies away from our fundamental 
responsibility for warfighting. To send ill-trained troops into combat makes us 
accomplices to murder. 
 • Acknowledge that national security does have economic, social, educa-
tional, and environmental dimensions, but insist that this doesn’t necessarily 
mean the problems in those areas are the responsibility of the military to 
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correct. Stylishly designating efforts to solve national ills as “wars” doesn’t 
convert them into something appropriate for the employment of military forces. 
 • Readily cede budgetary resources to those agencies whose business it is to 
address the non-military issues the armed forces are presently asked to fix. We 
are not the DEA, EPA, Peace Corps, Department of Education, or Red Cross—
nor should we be. It has never been easy to give up resources, but in the long 
term we—and the nation—will be better served by a smaller but appropriately 
focused military.
 • Divest the defense budget of perception-skewing expenses. Narcotics inter-
diction, environmental cleanup, humanitarian relief, and other costs tangential 
to actual combat capability should be assigned to the budgets of DEA, EPA, 
State, and so forth. As long as these expensive programs are hidden in the 
defense budget, the taxpayer understandably—but mistakenly—will continue 
to believe he’s buying military readiness.
 • Continue to press for the elimination of superfluous, resource-draining 
Guard and Reserve units. Increase the training tempo, responsibilities, and 
compensation of those that remain.
 • Educate the public to the sophisticated training requirements occasioned 
by the complexities of modern warfare. It’s imperative we rid the public of 
the misperception that soldiers in peacetime are essentially unemployed and 
therefore free to assume new missions.94
 • Resist unification of the services not only on operational grounds, but also 
because unification would be inimical to the checks and balances that under-
pin democratic government. Slow the pace of fiscally driven consolidation 
so that the impact on less quantifiable aspects of military effectiveness can 
be scrutinized. 
 • Assure that officer accessions from the service academies correspond with 
overall force reductions (but maintain separate service academies) and keep 
ROTC on a wide diversity of campuses. If necessary, resort to litigation to 
maintain ROTC campus diversity.
 • Orient recruiting resources and campaigns toward ensuring that all 
echelons of society are represented in the military, without compromising 
standards.95 Accept that this kind of recruiting may increase costs. It’s worth it.
 • Work to moderate the base-as-an-island syndrome by providing improved 
incentives for military members and families to assimilate into civilian com-
munities. Within the information programs for our force of all-volunteer 
professionals (increasingly US-based), strengthen the emphasis upon such 
themes as the inviolability of the Constitution, ascendancy of our civilian lead-
ership over the military, and citizens’ responsibilities.
Finally, I would tell our classmates that democracy is a fragile institu-
tion that must be continuously nurtured and scrupulously protected. I would 
also tell them that they must speak out when they see the institution threatened; 
indeed, it is their duty to do so. Richard Gabriel aptly observed in his took To 
Serve with Honor that:
when one discusses dissent, loyalty, and the limits of military obliga-
tions, the central problem is that the military represents a threat to 
civil order not because it will usurp authority, but because it does not 
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speak out on critical policy decisions. The soldier fails to live up to 
his oath to serve the country if he does not speak out when he sees his 
civilian or military superiors executing policies he feels to be wrong.96
Gabriel was wrong when he dismissed the military’s potential to 
threaten civil order, but he was right when he described our responsibilities. 
The catastrophe that occurred on our watch took place because we failed to 
speak out against policies we knew were wrong. It’s too late for me to do any 
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